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ALASKA ON THE ASSET 
PROTECTION TRUST MAP: NOT FAR 
ENOUGH FOR A REGULATORY 




In 1997, Alaska became the first state to recognize self-settled discretionary 
spendthrift trusts. This groundbreaking legislation was motivated by the 
legislature’s desire to establish Alaska as America’s financial center for asset 
protection. Almost fifteen years have passed since Alaska placed itself on the 
asset protection map. This Note examines the legislative history of Alaska’s 
1997 Trust Act and compares it with several other states that have followed 
its lead, and ultimately seeks to answer whether Alaska has met its goal of 
becoming the financial center it envisioned.  
INTRODUCTION 
The subject of Trusts and Estates has been a thorn in the side of law 
students and practitioners for decades and it is filled with 
incomprehensible concepts such as the rule against perpetuities1—one of 
only a handful of subjects in which a court will excuse an attorney for 
lacking mastery.2 By the 1970s, offshore trusts had come to be seen as a 
 
*Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2012; Arizona State University, 
B.S. 2008. The author is grateful to David G. Shaftel, Esq., for reviewing and 
commenting on early drafts of this Note. He is also grateful to his wife and 
daughter for their love and support, and the members of the Alaska Law Review 
for their editorial guidance. 
 1.  An explanation of this rule, including all of its intricacies, is outside the 
scope of this Note. For a succinct explanation of the rule and its history, see W. 
Barton Leach, Perpetuities In A Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638, 638–71 (1938). 
 2.  See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 690 (Cal. 1961) (“In view of the 
state of the law relating to perpetuities and restraints on alienation and the 
nature of the error, if any, assertedly made by defendant in preparing the 
instrument, it would not be proper to hold that defendant failed to use such 
skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity 
commonly exercise.”). 
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way for those with wealth to shield their assets from U.S. tax liabilities.3 
In an attempt to close this tax loophole, Congress passed the Tax Reform 
Act of 1976,4 which enabled the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to treat 
assets transferred by an American to a foreign trust as the American 
settlor’s assets.5 Thus, beginning in the mid-1980s, the primary 
motivation for moving assets offshore changed from tax sheltering to 
protection from creditors.6 Seeing a need to create asset protection 
shelters, several small island jurisdictions, led by the Cook Islands, 
began to develop a foundational legal structure to support the influx of 
U.S. assets.7 In 1997, seeing the opportunity to compete against offshore 
asset protection trusts by developing a competitive environment, Alaska 
became the first state to recognize self-settled discretionary spendthrift 
trusts (also known as self-settled asset protection trusts)8 as a way to 
shield a settlor’s assets from creditors.9 
Almost fifteen years have passed since Alaska became the first state 
to recognize the use of asset protection trusts. Since that time, 
commentators have written numerous articles about the race to the 
bottom,10 the destruction of creditors’ rights, and the general money-
hungry state of our society.11 What these materials have not addressed, 
 
 3.  See Burton W. Kanter, The Foreign Trust - A ‘One World’ Concept of Tax 
Planning, 22 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 467, 469 (1970) (discussing the commonality of 
using foreign trusts for asset protection). 
 4.  Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). 
 5.  See id. A “settlor” is “[t]he grantor or donor in a deed of settlement” or 
“one who creates a trust.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1231 (5th ed. 1979). 
 6.  Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 
HASTINGS L.J. 287, 306–07 (2002) (discussing the formation of offshore asset 
protection shelters in a number of island jurisdictions). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  There seems to be some slight variation between the titles used to 
describe these trusts. Domestic asset protection trusts, which are generally 
identified as DAPTs, are also often labeled by emphasizing a particular feature 
that the trust provides. For example, a self-settled asset protection trust 
emphasizes the fact that the settlor is also a beneficiary, while a self-settled 
discretionary spendthrift trust emphasizes the discretionary authority of the 
trustee to disburse income and principal to the beneficiaries. Thus, this Note will 
generally use the asset protection trusts to describe the entire set of trusts which 
provide asset protection to the settlor. See infra Part I.A (providing more 
information on the specific features of various asset protection trusts). 
 9.  ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (2010). This statute became effective on April 2, 
1997. ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 20th Leg., 1st Sess., 0918 (Apr. 3, 1997). 
 10.  See, e.g., Christopher Paul, Note, Innovation or a Race to the Bottom? Trust 
“Modernization” in New Hampshire, 7 PIERCE L. REV. 353, 372 (2009) (discussing 
the possible race to the bottom in the context of New Hampshire’s adoption of 
discretionary asset protection trusts). 
 11.  See, e.g., Michael Sjuggerud, Comment, Defeating the Self-Settled 
Spendthrift Trust in Bankruptcy, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 977, 977–78 (2001) (claiming 
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however, is whether Alaska’s decision to become the first state to offer 
such protection allowed it to reap the benefits intended by its 
legislature. This Note attempts to answer this question by providing a 
background on trusts and the current state of the U.S. asset protection 
landscape.  
Part I provides a brief explanation of trusts and their uses through 
an examination of the history of asset protection trusts offshore. Part II 
examines the legislative history of Alaska’s 1997 Trust Act and attempts 
to parse the legislature’s various considerations and its primary 
motivations for passing the Act. Part II also examines the Act’s 
substance and subsequent amendments. Part III describes the aftermath 
of the Act’s passage, including other states’ reactions and subsequent 
challenges to domestic asset protection trusts. Finally, in light of the 
preceding sections, this Note concludes by providing insight regarding 
whether Alaska has achieved the goals it set out during the Trust Act’s 
passage. 
I. TRUST BASICS 
A.  What is a Trust? 
In Anglo-American law, a trust can be thought of as “a relationship 
in which one person is the holder of the title to property, subject to an 
equitable obligation to keep or use the property for the benefit of 
another.”12 The definition denotes three basic elements: (1) a trustee; (2) 
a beneficiary, or cestui que trust; and (3) the trust property, or trust res.13 
Trusts were developed in England with the purposes of reducing 
burdens generally associated with holding land, providing a means by 
which religious institutions could make profits from their land, and 
 
that the adoption of asset protection trusts by states encourages social 
stratification while incentivizing the wealthy to neglect their debt obligations). 
 12.  GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 1 (1921). 
There are a number of definitions for trusts including: 
a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising from a 
manifestation of intention to create that relationship and subjecting the 
person who holds title to the property to duties to deal with it for the 
benefit of charity or for one or more persons, at least one of whom is 
not the sole trustee. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003). For a survey of various definitions 
given to trusts, see Walter G. Hart, What is a Trust?, 15 LAW. Q. REV. 294, 294–98 
(1899). 
 13.  Paul M. Roder, American Asset Protection Trusts: Alaska and Delaware 
Move “Offshore” Trusts Onto the Mainland, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1253, 1261 (1999). 
LEE.V20 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2012 6:10 PM 
152 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 29:1 
making assets easier to transfer.14 Today, a “trust[] can be created for 
any legal purpose so long as the purpose does not violate public 
policy.”15 While there are many reasons to create a trust, in the U.S. 
trusts are generally created either for tax benefits or asset protection.16 
There are four general types of asset protection trusts. Spendthrift 
trusts are generally used to protect beneficiaries from creditors.17 A 
spendthrift trust is a “[t]rust[] in which the interest of a beneficiary 
cannot be assigned by him or reached by his creditors.”18 An example 
would be a parent who would like to provide for his or her children and 
chooses to place his or her assets in a trust for them because, for one 
reason or another, he or she does not want them to take ownership of 
the assets. Under these circumstances, a party with a claim against the 
children would be unable to reach the trust assets under the theory that 
the settlor (parent) is the owner of the property and can do with it as he 
or she wishes. Thus, nothing the children do can force the parent to part 
with his or her property outside of the parent’s will.19  
A second type of trust is the support and maintenance trust, which 
limits payment to the beneficiary of only as much income as is required 
for the support, maintenance, and education of the beneficiary.20 What 
qualifies as a support and maintenance item is laid out in the trust 
instrument. Here, creditors are barred under the theory that only those 
purposes laid out in the trust instrument can trigger a distribution.21 
A third type is the discretionary trust, where a third party trustee 
has sole discretion over disbursement. The trustee has the authority to 
distribute some, all, or even none of the assets of the trust. Here, a 
creditor would be barred because the trustee can simply refuse to make 
any disbursements to the beneficiaries that would go towards resolution 
of a creditor’s claim.22  
 
 14.  BOGERT, supra note 12, at 6. 
 15.  Roder, supra note 13, at 1261. 
 16.  Id. at 1262. Often times, asset protection will trigger tax benefits. The 
specific tax avoidance and deferral mechanisms of trusts are generally outside 
the scope of this Note. 
 17.  The spendthrift trust is generally seen as a way to protect 
“irresponsible” or “hapless” beneficiaries. Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The 
Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 434, 452 (1998).  
 18.  AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 151, at 83 
(4th ed. 1987). 
 19.  Roder, supra note 13, at 1262–63. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
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Finally, there is the protective trust with a forfeiture clause. This 
trust can be seen as a hybrid of both the spendthrift and discretionary 
trusts. Upon a triggering event, any interest in the trust is forfeited by 
the beneficiary and reverts solely to the trustee, who then gains full 
discretion.23 A major drawback to a trust with a forfeiture clause is the 
possibility that an unforeseen triggering event could frustrate the 
settlor’s purpose.24 
B.  Offshore Trusts 
Prior to the passage of the Alaska Trust Act in 1997, U.S. based 
trusts did not afford creditor protection to the settlor of the trust. 
American professionals susceptible to malpractice suits had for years 
sought the protection of offshore asset protection trusts.25 The laws of 
offshore jurisdictions were friendlier to these professionals because 
these jurisdictions did not have the traditional creditor protections that 
had long been a staple of U.S. trust law.26 The Cook Islands became a 
leader in the area of offshore asset protection trusts.27 Beginning with the 
foundation of a standard spendthrift trust, these jurisdictions made 
major changes, including offering settlors the ability to transfer money 
into a trust, the ability to appoint a trustee who has discretion over how 
to distribute the income to the beneficiaries, and, in the case of a self-
settled trust, the ability to make the settlor a beneficiary.28 Other primary 
protections offered by the Cook Islands, for example, included raising 
the level of proof for fraudulent transfer claims,29 expressly providing 
that the Cook Island courts would not “enforce or recognize a foreign 
judgment against an international trust,”30 and flight clauses, which 
essentially authorized the trustee to “change the situs of the trust, 
change the applicable law, and move the trust assets to a new 
jurisdiction, if a claim against the trust threaten[ed] to be successful.”31 
Such provisions, including confidentiality of settlors, were basically 
designed to guarantee that assets held in an offshore asset protection 
trust would be completely unavailable to creditors. 
 
 23.  Id. at 1264. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 1254. Professionals particularly susceptible to malpractice suits 
include doctors, lawyers, accountants, business officers, and directors. 
 26.  See Danforth, supra note 6, at 306–07. 
 27.  Id. at 307–08. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 308–09. 
 30.  Id. at 309. 
 31.  Id. at 310. 
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Despite these advantages, the asset protection trusts offered by 
offshore jurisdictions are not without their drawbacks. A major factor 
when considering the use of a foreign asset protection trust is the risk 
associated with political or economic instability of the foreign 
jurisdiction.32 Additional considerations include the extremely thorough 
reporting standards required by the IRS for assets held in offshore trusts 
as well as possible tax implications.33 Even with these potential 
drawbacks, the IRS reported in 2009 that upwards of $5 trillion is held in 
offshore “tax havens.”34 With the potential to benefit from both fees 
associated with servicing asset protection trusts and the potential influx 
of professional jobs created by the need to handle these trusts, the 
Alaska Legislature took aim at the market. 
II. ALASKA AND ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS 
A.  Background: Domestic Asset Protection Trusts 
Until 1997, no state permitted self-settled asset protection trusts. 
Put another way, no state allowed settlors to shield the assets they put in 
trust for themselves from creditors, finding it against public policy.35 
Establishing offshore asset protection trust equivalents in the United 
States was opposed on three basic grounds. The first, and perhaps 
strongest, was that society would create a moral hazard by allowing a 
settlor to shield assets from potential future creditors.36 This argument is 
based on the fact that many U.S. civil penalties are monetary in nature.37 
To allow a settlor to shield assets placed in a trust while maintaining 
effective control over the distribution of the assets would eliminate any 
 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  See generally 1 JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE AND MULTINATIONAL 
ESTATE PLANNING § 18.23[C][1] (2d ed. 1999) (providing an in-depth analysis of 
IRS implications of offshore trusts). 
 34.  See Abusive Offshore Tax Avoidance Scheme - Talking Points, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=106568,00.html (last 
updated Jan. 31, 2012). In 1994, it was estimated that there was approximately $1 
trillion held in offshore asset protection trusts. James T. Lorenzetti, The Offshore 
Trust: A Contemporary Asset Protection Scheme, 102 COM. L.J. 138, 140 (1997). 
 35.  David G. Shaftel, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Key Issues and Answers, 
SHAFTEL LAW OFFICES, http://shaftellaw.com/article21.html (last visited Mar. 9, 
2012). This public policy allowed the IRS to argue that because creditors could 
reach a settlor’s assets in a trust, transfers to domestic asset protection trusts 
were thus incomplete and taxable as part of the settlor’s estate. Id. 
 36.  Richard C. Ausness, The Offshore Asset Protection Trust: A Prudential 
Financial Planning Device or the Last Refuge of a Scoundrel?, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 147, 
184–85 (2007). 
 37.  Id. 
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incentive for the settlor to refrain from reckless or grossly negligent 
behavior.38 Some even argued that the only reason for creating a self-
settled spendthrift trust would be to commence in fraud.39 Second, asset 
protection trusts would usurp federal and state exempt property 
statutes.40 A prime example would be states that have homestead acts 
and restrict either the type or value of home that can be shielded from 
creditors. Through the use of an asset protection trust, a settlor could 
theoretically transfer any amount and type of property to the trust and 
thereby shield the assets from creditors’ claims without limit.41 Finally, 
some argued that asset protection trusts would only be utilized by the 
wealthy due to the costs associated with setting up and maintaining an 
asset protection trust.42 As such, the increase in availability of such trusts 
would only further advantage the upper class while offering no 
protection to the lower.43 
Arguments in favor of offering asset protection trusts in the U.S. 
are equally robust, with the most favored being the idea that such trusts 
provide protection from meritless claims.44 Numerous examples exist 
whereby the existing legal checks on meritless claims do not work or 
wrongful parties escapes liability.45 While it is possible that such cases 
are anomalous and that the majority of individuals or institutions will 
never face such claims, such a possibility should not prevent those who 
 
 38.  See Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to 
Liability?, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479, 504–06 (2000). 
 39.  See GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 40 (6th ed. 1987). 
 40.  Darsi Newman Sirknen, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts, What’s The Big 
Deal?, 8 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 133, 142–43 (2006). 
 41.  Id. at 143. 
 42.  Id. One writer even goes so far as to argue that the adoption of self-
settled asset protection trusts by a number of states has “facilitate[d] continued 
social stratification by discouraging wealthy debtors from repaying their debts 
even when they have the ability to do so.” Sjuggerud, supra note 11, at 977–78. 
Proponents of asset protection trusts respond by stating that “[a]lmost all estate 
planning lawyers, almost all of the time, represent honorable, law-abiding 
clients, men and women who daily contribute to society by their productivity 
and with their generosity, who pay their bills and their taxes, and who are not 
deadbeats, cheats, frauds, or criminals.” Duncan E. Osborne et al., Asset 
Protection: Trust Planning, SJ036 ALI-ABA 1419, 1428 (ALI-ABA C.L.E. Annual 
Advanced Course of Study Nov. 17–21, 2003). 
 43.  Professor Lischer counters this argument by pointing out that 
“protection from liability is available to any person who desires such protection. 
A person can become judgment proof by becoming poor.” Lischer, supra note 38, 
at 529. 
 44.  See Sirknen, supra note 40, at 143–53. 
 45.  See, e.g., Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 331–32 
(Tex. 1998) (holding that a manufacturer was strictly liable for an injury to the 
victim even though the victim admitted ignoring several conspicuously placed 
warning signs and a pictograph). 
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want to protect themselves from the possibility of doing so. 
Additionally, one might argue that if meritless claims were actually the 
pressing issue that many believe it to be, the legislature would surely do 
something about the problem. In fact, that there have been so many 
proposals and that today there are a number of states that have adopted 
asset protection trust laws46 indicates at least some legislative support. 
The fact that legislatures are creating greater protections through trust 
laws can be seen as a tacit acknowledgment of the problems at hand.  
Another major argument favoring domestic asset protection trusts 
is that they combine asset protection opportunities that are already 
available. Between homestead acts, ERISA, offshore asset protection 
trusts, and family limited partnerships, many if not all of the protections 
afforded by domestic asset protection trust laws are already attainable. 
The difference, however, is the ability to make them more accessible by 
lowering transaction costs.47 This leads to the final and primary 
motivation for the Alaska Legislature as it considered the Alaska Trust 
Act: keeping assets in the U.S. provides a means to stimulate local and 
state economies. 
B.  Legislative History of Alaska’s 1997 Statute 
In the early 1990s, a New York trust attorney, his brother, and an 
Alaskan attorney conceived the idea that Alaska could be an onshore 
 
 46.  See DAVID G. SHAFTEL, COMPARISON OF THE DOMESTIC ASSET PROTECTION 
TRUST STATUTES 13 (2010), available at http://shaftellaw.com/docs/ 
comparison_domestic_apt_statutes.pdf (noting from 1997–2008 twelve states 
allowed for creation of asset protection trusts).  
 47.  David Shaftel, an Alaska trusts and estates attorney, provides this 
extremely helpful hypothetical of a typical case of a couple that would benefit 
from a domestic asset protection trust: 
[The] clients are a couple in their 50s. One or both is a small business 
owner, executive, or professional. Their net worth is in the range of $3 
million to $10 million. Substantial estate taxes could be saved if your 
clients made annual exclusion and applicable credit gifts to irrevocable 
trusts for their children and/or grandchildren. These gifts will not 
render the clients insolvent, nor will they be transfers made with an 
intent to evade existing creditors. The gifts could be structured so that 
they qualify for valuation discounts, and the growth of the gift assets 
would be excluded from your clients’ estates. Based on your clients’ net 
worth and their anticipated future earnings, it appears that these gifted 
amounts would not be needed by them. Nevertheless, your clients are 
reluctant to give away significant assets at this point in their lives. They 
tell you that they might need these assets in the future if they have an 
unexpected financial reversal. 
David Shaftel, Alaska’s Experience With Self-Settled Discretionary Spendthrift Trusts, 
29 EST. PLN. 506, 507–08 (2002). 
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alternative to offshore asset protection trusts.48 What followed in the 
legislature was a debate over whether and how Alaska should break 
from every other state and provide the first self-settled asset protection 
trust. A brief journey through the legislative history will show that 
economic growth was a primary motivation spurring legislative 
discussion.49 
On February 10, 1997 proponents and sponsors of House Bill 101 
met to discuss and debate the merits of Alaska becoming the first state 
to offer the protection of a self-settled asset protection trust that could 
run in perpetuity.50 The prime sponsor of the bill, Representative Al 
Vezey, began by explaining that the initial motivation for the bill came 
while seeking ways to stimulate Alaska’s economy.51 Representative 
Vezey’s vision for Alaska was to see it become not only the financial 
center of America, but perhaps the entire world.52 To this end, his office 
sought to find a way to change the laws of Alaska to encourage financial 
markets to relocate and headquarter in Alaska.53 He also noted that the 
trust landscape over the past one hundred years had tilted in favor of 
creditors’ rights and towards the weakening of trusts, allowing, in some 
cases, creditors who came into being some fifty years after the 
establishment of a trust to invade the trust under a “fraudulent transfer” 
exception.54  
In discussing the current trusts and estates landscape and the 
potential economic benefits to Alaska, it appears that with regards to 
creditors’ rights, the legislators focused primarily on the potential claims 
of children and spouses.55 Chairman Rokeberg noted that a very similar 
version of this bill had been vetoed the previous year over concerns of 
the possibility of a settlor establishing a trust to escape child support.56 
The bill from the previous year had been met with broad acceptance 
from the Alaska Legislature, passing both houses with only one 
opposing vote in each chamber.57 When Representative Vezey was 
asked about concern from the administration regarding the previously 
 
 48.  Paul, supra note 10, at 358. 
 49.  See HB 101 - Trusts & Property Transfers in Trust, ALASKA H. LABOR & 
COMMERCE COMM. MINUTES, 20th Leg. (Feb. 10, 1997) [hereinafter House Minutes]; 
HB 101 – Trusts & Property Transfers in Trust, ALASKA S. JUDICIARY COMM. 
MINUTES, 20th Leg. (Mar. 7, 1997) [hereinafter Senate Minutes]. 
 50.  See House Minutes, supra note 49; see also Senate Minutes, supra note 49. 
 51.  See House Minutes, supra note 49 (statement of Rep. Al Vezey). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  See generally id.; Senate Minutes, supra note 49. 
 56.  House Minutes, supra note 49 (statement of Chairman Rokeberg). 
 57.  See id. (statement of Rep. Al Vezey). 
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presented bill, he replied that one would have to have a vivid 
imagination to believe that a trust could be used by a settlor to avoid 
obligations of child support, and the current draft of the bill had been 
amended to address that specific concern.58 Even with all the discussion 
about the potential for shielding from child support claims, as well as 
discussions regarding the types of people that would pay to set up trusts 
and the average net worth of those generally interested in asset 
protection trusts,59 the legislature allowed the bill to pass with the 
chance that a settlor might avoid child support in certain 
circumstances.60 The bill settled on a thirty-day window, requiring at the 
time of the trust formation that the settlor not be in arrears in child 
support payments by thirty days or more.61 While protection of children 
and spouses is important, it is curious that the legislators did not 
specifically mention the potential usurpation of other creditors’ rights.62 
The general reasoning behind the need to shield specific claimants 
is that it is difficult to make distinctions between creditors when it 
comes to the protections afforded by trusts. The legislators decided that 
because the trust would be subject to the laws of Alaska as interpreted 
by Alaska’s courts, no injustice would occur.63 This was partially based 
on the fact that Alaska has a very small body of common law and case 
law dealing with trusts, which they also saw as an advantage compared 
to other competing jurisdictions.64 This explains a major reason for the 
debate on whether a trust should be invadable for child support. The 
ability of a child claimant to invade the trust not only affects a potential 
child support claimant; it opens the possibility that other claimants 
might be able to invade the trust,65 and a trust subject to invasion carries 
with it potential tax implications.66 
 
 58.  See id. 
 59.  See id. (statement of Richard Hempesch, Attorney). 
 60.  See id. (statement of Vincent Usera, Assistant Att’y Gen.) 
 61.  See id. 
 62.  See generally id.; see also Senate Minutes, supra note 49. Robert Manley, 
Attorney, did mention the case of O.J. Simpson and pointed out that such a 
scenario playing out with an Alaska trust would not happen because O.J. 
Simpson already had a creditor’s judgment against him at the time he set up his 
trust in the Isle of Man. House Minutes, supra note 49 (statement of Robert 
Manley, Attorney). 
 63.  See generally House Minutes, supra note 49. 
 64.  See id. (statement of Rep. Al Vezey) (“We don’t have 200 years of court 
presidencies [sic] and supreme court rulings to muddy the waters in terms of 
what our laws mean.”). 
 65.  See id. 
 66.  This is because, for IRS purposes, only a completed gift can be excluded 
from a settlor’s estate. For example, the IRS looks at the settlor/beneficiary’s 
discretion with regards to allocation of transferred assets. If a beneficiary’s 
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The child support protections received extensive discussion. An 
attorney testified and noted that under the current draft, so long as the 
initial conveyance by the settlor was not found to be fraudulent and the 
four-year statute of limitations had run, the assets of the trust would be 
shielded.67 Discussion also noted that in cases where the settlor is also 
the beneficiary, the principle that the beneficiary is not the owner of the 
trust’s assets and therefore cannot alienate them was reduced to a legal 
fiction.68 
In further discussing the prospects of luring investment and 
economic growth to Alaska, members of the legislature also considered 
the fact that most of the asset protection business was largely going to 
foreign countries that not only had strong trust laws but also allowed 
the preservation of assets for future generations in perpetuity.69 
Representative Vezey brought attention to what the members 
considered to be the primary competition to Alaska’s aggressive entry 
into the trust market: offshore trusts.70 Vezey explained that there was a 
tremendous market for asset protection and preservation of wealth, and 
the Cayman Islands was home to more than thirty major banks 
administering funds and servicing trusts.71 The legislators, aware of the 
amount of wealth that had flowed to these foreign jurisdictions, sought 
the positive benefits such wealth brought.72 Attorney Richard Hompesch 
specifically made mention of his trip to the Cook Islands and how 
impressed he was to see the thriving economy of a small island nation 
“with a population less than the Fairbanks North Star Borough.”73 As 
the conversation turned to Alaska’s competitive prowess against places 
such as the Cook Islands, Mr. Hompesch pointed out that although the 
 
creditors can reach the transferred assets, in theory, it means that the 
settlor/beneficiary has the authority to force the trust to pay the creditors. The 
IRS views such authority to mean that the original “gift” to the trust was 
incomplete. Therefore, if a creditor is allowed to invade the trust, the trust is also 
subject to taxes a completed gift would otherwise not be subject to. See generally 
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201208026 (Sept. 28, 2011) (citing I.R.C. 25.2511-2(b) 
“provid[ing], in part, that as to any property or interest therein, of which the 
donor has so parted with dominion and control as to leave in him no power to 
change its disposition, the give is complete.”  
 67.  House Minutes, supra note 49 (statement of Robert Manley, Attorney). 
 68.  See id. (statement of Vincent Usera, Assistant Att’y Gen.). 
 69.  See id. (statements of Rep. Al Vezey, Assistant Att’y Gen. Vincent Usera, 
and Chairman Rokeberg). This reasoning was also used to encourage 
consideration of repealing Alaska’s rule against perpetuities statute. Id. 
 70.  Id. (statement of Rep. Al Vezey). 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See id. (statements of Richard Hompesch, Attorney, Robert Manley, 
Attorney, and Rep. Al Vezey). 
 73.  Id. (statement of Richard Hompesch, Attorney). 
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differences between the two were extreme, Alaska had the advantage of 
being promoted through the Internet, so “attorneys all over the United 
States will become interested in this act and will be interested in setting 
up trusts in Alaska.”74 In the discussions, the legislators were warned 
against expecting any significant amount of wealth to come from these 
offshore shelters to Alaska.75 While the bill would allow Alaska to have 
a measurable advantage over its sister states, this advantage would not 
extend to offshore jurisdictions that were not subject to the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause.76 There was mention, however, of the possibility of 
attracting foreign wealth to Alaska using, as a competitive advantage, 
the political stability of the United States broadly, and Alaska 
specifically, in contrast to that of the island nations that were currently 
the go-to trust capitals.77 
The discussion also included the competitive advantages held by 
both Delaware and South Dakota for housing corporations and national 
credit card companies, respectively.78 Mr. Manley, state chairman of the 
American College of Trusts and State Counsels, testified that he was in 
favor of the legislation because it was an opportunity to bring a thriving 
industry to Alaska, and statutory modification had been the approach 
that other states had used to gain their competitive advantages.79 South 
Dakota, for example, had recently eliminated the rule against 
perpetuities in an effort to enter the trusts market and had previously 
repealed its law regarding maximum interest rate charges, which 
opened the door for national credit card companies to set up processing 
centers in South Dakota. In addition, Mr. Manley spoke of his experience 
with other trust friendly jurisdictions. He discussed the status of the 
Cook Islands before they entered the trust market as “a small place 
somewhere out of New Zealand.”80 However, because of their trust 
business, the Cook Islands had attracted rich and famous people who 
want a certain caliber of accommodations, which created a direct boost 
to the economy.81 
Legislators also turned their attention to the area of fraudulent 
transfers. Specifically, they discussed Missouri, which had attempted to 
pass a similar trust act years prior but had not realized the hoped for 
 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  See Senate Minutes, supra note 49 (statement of Jeffrey Schoenblum, 
Professor). 
 76.  See id. 
 77.  House Minutes, supra note 49 (statement of Robert Manley, Attorney). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
LEE.V20 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2012 6:10 PM 
2012 ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS 161 
benefits.82 A major reason for Missouri’s failure was the uncertainty 
surrounding the idea of fraudulent transfers.83 Without a clear way to 
test whether a transfer to a trust is fraudulent or not, a father setting up 
a trust for his son’s education who whispers to his attorney “[a]nd you 
know what, if I go broke at least I know my kids are going to college” 
could be deemed to have intended to defraud future creditors.84 
Another policy argument in favor of Alaska establishing itself as 
the self-settled asset protection headquarters was the fact that through 
many different courses of action, it was possible that a person could 
achieve similar types of protection.85 Kevin Walsh, an accountant from 
Fairbanks, testified that in shielding assets from future creditors, the 
legislature was ensuring that these trust creators would receive the same 
protection that people receive when they: 
[give] to charity, transfer stock or other assets to [their] 
children, make transfers to corporations and retirement plans, 
buy an insurance policy, invest in a limited partnership [or] in a 
limited liability company, create a[n] . . . estate, [or] impair 
[their] property with a covenant or an easement. All of these 
things may add to the detriment of some future creditor . . . .86 
Mr. Walsh noted that if the goal of the trust legislation was to allow 
people to protect assets for the future, such instruments were already 
plentiful; what made this bill unique was its ability to afford protection 
and use of the asset to the settlor in the present.87 
Finally, there were still areas that were unclear for the legislature, 
including exactly how corporate securities would work and the 
percentage of assets that would actually be held in Alaska. While these 
amounts were said to be “unquantifiable,” Representative Vezey 
pointed out that “in managing money the new wealth that the industry 
creates for managers are the fees [] charged. . . . irrespective of where the 
assets are located.”88 Regarding the ambiguity surrounding the 
requirement of where the assets physically would be located, Chairman 
 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. (statement of Kevin Walsh, CPA); see also infra Part II.A (providing a 
general list of alternative instruments that can be employed to achieve similar 
protections to a domestic self-settled asset protection trust). 
 86.  See House Minutes, supra note 49 (statement of Kevin Walsh, CPA). Mr. 
Walsh also added that he did not believe the current bill as written added onto 
the detriment of future potential creditors in the same way that the current list 
did. Id. 
 87.  See id. 
 88.  See id. (statement of Rep. Al Vezey). 
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Rokeberg asked whether, if there was at least “$1 here[,] the fact [is] that 
the use of the law [of] the state of Alaska would undoubtedly generate a 
substantial amount of legal business?”89 An attorney responded, “I 
believe so.”90 
While the minutes of the legislative sessions do not contain the 
thoughts of all the members of the Alaska Legislature, they do suggest 
that a primary motivation for debate and ultimate passage of the bill 
was the economic growth of Alaska. 
C.  Substance of Alaska’s 1997 Act 
Several provisions made Alaska’s Act groundbreaking with respect 
to U.S. trust law. First was the fact that Alaska authorized self-settled 
discretionary spendthrift trusts. In contrast to the Restatement (Third) of 
Trusts position that when a beneficiary is appointed as the sole trustee, a 
claimant can generally reach the maximum amount that the beneficiary 
could distribute to himself,91 Alaska’s asset protection trust statute 
provided that the spendthrift provision would be valid even in such 
cases.92 This was a significant departure from the general public policy 
of restricting the owner of property from creating, for his own benefit, 
an interest in his property that he can shield from creditors.93 The Act 
specifically provides that “[a] person who in writing transfers property 
in trust may provide that the interest of a beneficiary of the trust . . . may 
not be either voluntarily or involuntarily transferred before payment or 
delivery of the interest to the beneficiary by the trustee.”94 The limitation 
on distributions for tax purposes is that a settlor who is also a 
beneficiary should have no authority to make distributions to himself, 
but instead distributions to the settlor should be subject to the “sole and 
absolute discretion of an independent trustee.”95 So while a settlor could 
 
 89.  See id. (statement of Chairman Rokeberg). 
 90.  See id. (statement of Richard Thwaites, Attorney). 
 91.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 3, 69 (2003) . The general legal 
principle behind this inability to be the sole trustee and sole beneficiary is the 
merger doctrine. See id. § 3 cmt. d, § 69; Julian v. Nw. Trust Co., 255 N.W. 622, 
623 (Minn. 1934). 
 92.  See ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.40.110–310 (2010). This distinction goes back to 
the public policy argument that a settlor should not be able to transfer assets into 
a trust, thus shielding the assets from creditors, yet maintain control over how 
those assets are to be disbursed. See supra Part II.A. 
 93.  See David G. Shaftel, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Key Issues and 
Answers, SHAFTEL LAW OFFICES, http://shaftellaw.com/article21.html (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2012). 
 94.  ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(a). 
 95.  David G. Shaftel, Newest Developments in Alaska Law Encourage Use of 
Alaska Trusts, 26 EST. PLAN. 51, 57 (1999). 
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make discretionary distributions to himself, he would be doing it at the 
cost of tax consequences on the assets in the trust as part of the settlor’s 
estate.96 A settlor could maneuver around this by appointing himself as 
a co-trustee with limited distribution authority and allowing the other 
co-trustee, an independent third party, to have complete discretionary 
distribution authority.97 
Additionally, Alaska provided that no creditor of the settlor is able 
to reach the trust’s assets; this includes child support agencies, spouses, 
and ex-spouses. While this was criticized and debated during the 
legislative process, Alaska’s Child Support Enforcement Division 
negotiated with the legislature to make such protection dependent on 
the completion of the gift.98 That is, the spendthrift provision only 
shields against creditors who arise subsequent to the establishment of the 
trust and not against child support claims arising before the 
establishment.99 The Act provides that “the transfer restriction prevents 
a creditor existing when the trust is created or a person who 
subsequently becomes a creditor from satisfying a claim out of the 
beneficiary’s interest in the trust.”100 
While the Alaska Legislature was able to provide many of the 
substantial protections it had hoped for, it was unable to provide any 
benefits that were unique to Alaska as compared to what other states 
could potentially provide. A notable issue with all domestic asset 
protection trusts is the fact that a court in a different jurisdiction, one 
that does not recognize self-settled asset protection trusts, might grant 
creditors access to the Alaska trust.101  
 
 96.  See id; see also GIDEON ROTHSCHILD ET AL., IRS RULES SELF-SETTLED ALASKA 
TRUST WILL NOT BE IN GRANTOR’S ESTATE 9–13 (2010), available at 
http://www.alaskatrust.com/assets/files/articles/why_alaska_trust/Self_Settl
ed.pdf. 
 97.  See Shaftel, supra note 95, at 53. 
 98.  See House Minutes, supra note 49 (statement of Richard Thwaites, 
Attorney) (noting that completed gifts are not invadable). 
 99.  See supra Part II.B (providing an overview of legislative discussions on 
the issue of child support and the thirty day rule that was adopted in an effort to 
protect child support claimants); see also ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(b)(4) (2011). 
 100.  ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(b). This provision is subject to four exceptions: 
(1) that the settlor’s intent was not to defraud; (2) that the settlor may not 
terminate the trust without consent of any person who has a substantial 
beneficial interest; (3) that the trust does not require all income be distributed to 
the settlor; and (4) that the settlor is not thirty days or more in arrears on child 
support payments. ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(b)(1)–(4). 
 101. Alaska has attempted to explicitly combat this by allowing the settlor to 
name Alaska as the choice of law governing the trust and through a statute that 
states that Alaska’s courts have exclusive jurisdiction over trusts in its state. 
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D.  Subsequent Amendments 
The following subsections detail some of the subsequent 
amendments to and interpretations of Alaska’s Trust Act. It is not a 
comprehensive list, but it shows Alaska’s continued willingness to 
maintain and increase its advantage in the increasingly competitive 
domestic trust market. 
1.  2003 Amendments 
A unique aspect of the Alaska’s trust law doesn’t come from the 
specific wording of the 1997 Act alone, but the wording combined with 
the 2003 amendments to the statute restricting transfers of trust 
interests,102 as compared against the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act 
(UFTA),103 which has been adopted by most states.104 The primary 
challenge of the UFTA comes from the circumstances under which a 
transfer is fraudulent. First, a transfer is deemed fraudulent under the 
UFTA if the debtor made the transfer “with actual intent to hinder, 
delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.”105 In discussing Alaska’s 
fraud statute, an attorney testified to the difficulty with the phrase 
“intent to hinder.”106 In 2003, Alaska made further groundbreaking 
change to its asset protection trust statute when it corrected what was 
seen as a major defect in previous self-settled trust legislation: it 
 
 102.  Act of October 8, 2003, 2003 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 138. The 2003 
amendments require the settlor to sign an affidavit to the following: 
(1) the settlor has full right, title, and authority to transfer the assets to 
the trust; (2) the transfer of the assets to the trust will not render the 
settlor insolvent; (3) the settlor does not intend to defraud a creditor by 
transferring the assets to the trust; (4) the settlor does not have any 
pending or threatened court actions against the settlor, except for those 
court actions identified by the settlor on an attachment to the affidavit; 
(5) the settlor is not involved in any administrative proceedings, except 
for those administrative proceedings identified on an attachment to the 
affidavit; (6) at the time of the transfer of the assets to the trust, the 
settlor is not currently in default of a child support obligation by more 
than thirty (30) days; (7) the settlor does not contemplate filing for relief 
under the provisions of 11 U.S.C. (Bankruptcy Code); and (8) the assets 
being transferred to the trust were not derived from unlawful activities. 
 Id. at 5–6 (codified at ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(j)). 
 103.  Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, 7A-2 U.L.A. 274 (1984) [hereinafter 
UFTA]. 
 104.  As of 2010, forty-four states have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfers Act. Fraudulent Transfer Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, 
http://www.nccusl.org/Act.aspx?title=Fraudulent Transfer Act (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2012). 
 105.  See UFTA, supra note 103, § 4. This applies to both current and future 
creditors. Id. at § 4(a). 
 106.  See House Minutes, supra note 49 (statement of Robert Manley, Attorney). 
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redefined the statute of limitations for “pre-existing creditors.” In other 
states, pre-existing creditors generally have a statute of limitations of 
some time period after the creation of the trust or some period of time 
after they should have discovered the asset transfer, whichever is 
longer.107 This potentially opened the door to claimants that do not 
discover their cause of action for decades following the transfer of 
assets.108 To correct this, Alaska’s statute now limits the length of time to 
four years from the transfer date and does away with the notion of 
reasonably discoverable.109 Alaska also eliminated an intent to hinder 
with regard to transferred assets as a potential source of liability for a 
fraudulent transfer and chose to keep only an “intent to defraud” as a 
possible source of liability.110 This was another major step in shielding 
trust assets from creditors because in addition to tax benefits, the very 
nature of a self-settled trust is to “hinder or delay” a creditor.111 Thus, 
for states that had adopted the UFTA, the problem was made apparent 
in Breitenstine v. Breitenstine.112 Deciding in a divorce case whether 
transfers of assets to an offshore asset protection trust—the assets of 
which were comprised primarily of gifts from parents to the husband—
were fraudulent, the Wyoming Supreme Court noted, “[o]ur case law 
indicates that an intent to hinder or delay creditors is enough to consider 
the conveyance fraudulent even if there was no actual fraud.”113 
Furthermore, Alaska courts are required to have proof of actual 
fraud, and while not recognizing the concept of constructive fraud, they 
will allow claimants to bring in “indicia of fraud” or “badges of 
fraud.”114 As the Alaska Supreme Court said in First National Bank of 
Fairbanks v. Enzler: 
The compelling ones in terms of long-recognized indicia of 
fraud are: (1) The consideration . . . is inadequate. . . . (2) The 
transfer of the property was in anticipation of a pending 
 
 107.  See Stephen Greer, Alaska Adopts a New Trust Law, TR. & EST., Aug. 1, 
2003, at 4, available at http://www.alaskatrust.com/assets/files/articles/ 
why_alaska_trust/new_trust_law.pdf. 
 108.  See id. Greer gives the hypothetical of a doctor who is unaware of any 
patient complaints at the time he transfers assets into a trust. In this situation, a 
patient who was seen prior to the transfer can assert a claim subsequent to the 
transfer and would be able to assert a fraudulent transfer claim at any time, if a 
court held the patient was a pre-existing claimant. See id. 
 109.  See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (2010). 
 110.  See id. § 34.40.110(b)(1). 
 111.  See Greer, supra note 107, at 4. 
 112.  62 P.3d 587 (Wyo. 2003). 
 113.  Id. at 592 (citing In re Estate of Reed, 566 P.2d 587, 590 (Wyo. 1977)). 
 114.  See First Nat’l Bank of Fairbanks v. Enzler, 537 P.2d 517, 521–22 (Alaska 
1975). 
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suit . . . . (3) The transfer or debtor was insolvent . . . . (4) There 
was a failure to record the instrument within a reasonable 
length of time . . . . (5) The conveyance was a transfer of all or 
substantially all the debtor’s property . . . . (6) The retention of 
possession of the premises by the grantor from the date of the 
execution of the deed . . . stands unexplained . . . . (7) The 
transfer so completely depleted the assets of Dale Trude that 
his creditor, the plaintiff, has thereby been hindered and 
delayed in recovering any part of his judgment. . . . (8) The 
relationship of the parties becomes an additional badge of 
fraud when there also appear other circumstances which of 
themselves incite distrust and suspicion . . . .115 
The Alaska Supreme Court has held that, “[b]adges of fraud must 
be viewed within the context of each particular case, and where their 
presence is satisfactorily accounted for, or where their existence is not 
inconsistent with a construction of the transaction as a valid one, they 
deserve to be accorded little weight.”116 Thus, even in cases where 
badges of fraud clearly exist, courts may require more before 
invalidating a transfer.117 While it is not impossible for other states to 
amend their statutes to follow Alaska’s fraud statutes, it is unlikely 
given that Alaska is an outlier in its construction of its fraudulent 
transfer statute. Thus, for the time being, Alaska may have a sustainable 
advantage when it comes to protection from future creditors. 
Finally, in order to be more competitive with offshore asset 
protection trusts, Alaska explicitly authorized the use of both trust 
protectors and advisors.118 While a settlor cannot appoint a close friend 
or relative as a trustee, unlike in the Cook Islands,119 this provision 
allows the settlor to appoint a “disinterested third party” who would 
have the power to remove a trustee, modify the trust instrument, adjust 
the interest of the beneficiaries, and modify the power of appointment in 
the trust.120 This provision gives the settlor additional control over the 
trust by allowing multiple checks to be placed on the trustee. 
 
 
 115.  Id. at 522 (quoting Evans v. Trude, 240 P.2d 940, 944 (Or. 1952)). 
 116.  Sylvester v. Sylvester, 723 P.2d 1253, 1258 (Alaska 1986) (quoting 
Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213, 1223 (Alaska 1971)). 
 117.  See id. 
 118.  See ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.40.110(h), 13.36.370, 13.36.375 (2010). 
 119.  See Danforth, supra note 6, at 309. The Cook Islands gives additional 
protections when the protector is a U.S. citizen and thus subject to U.S. laws. The 
settlor can give the protector only veto power and can also enact a “duress” 
clause. See id. at 309–11. 
 120.  See ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.36.370, 13.36.375. 
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2.  2006 Amendments 
Based on a series of articles regarding the possibility that a divorce 
court might find that some of the interests transferred to a self-settled 
asset protection trust belong to a divorced spouse,121 in 2006 the Alaska 
Legislature adopted amendments designed to protect a trust in those 
cases.122 Specifically, the legislature added subsection (m), which states: 
If a trust has a transfer restriction allowed under (a) of this 
section, in the event of the divorce or dissolution of the 
marriage of a beneficiary of the trust, the beneficiary’s interest 
in the trust is not considered property subject to division under 
AS 25.24.160 or 25.24.230 or a part of a property division under 
AS 25.24.160 or 25.24.230. Unless otherwise agreed to in writing 
by the parties to the marriage, this subsection does not apply to 
a settlor’s interest in a self-settled trust with respect to assets 
transferred to the trust 
(1) after the settlor’s marriage; or 
(2) within 30 days before the settlor’s marriage unless the 
settlor gives written notice to the other party to the 
marriage of the transfer.123 
However, Alaska didn’t stop there. Alaska also amended its statute 
to lower the statute of limitations on claims brought against a trustee 
from twenty-four months down to just six months.124 
3.  Internal Revenue Service Interpretation 
Understanding that Alaska had set new precedent in creating the 
first workable asset protection trust statute, a remaining issue was 
whether the IRS accepted the new instrument as a completed gift.125 This 
was important because if the IRS did not see transfers to a self-settled 
asset protection trust as a completed gift, it would hinder the use of such 
trusts by those seeking the dual advantages of asset protection and tax 
planning.126 In a private letter ruling request, an attorney asked the IRS 
 
 121.  See, e.g., Marc Chorney, Interests in Trusts in Divorce: What the Settlor 
Giveth, the Divorce Court May Take Away, 40 U. MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN. 14 
(2006). Alaska may have been the first state to actually address the subject 
directly. See Krize v. Krize, 145 P.3d 481, 490 (Alaska 2006) (stating that where 
one spouse was the beneficiary of an inheritance held in a trust and where the 
“inheritance is virtually certain” a court should have no problem in considering 
the assets therein).  
 122.  Act of June 15, 2006, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 66. 
 123.   Id. at 7 (codified at ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(l) (2010)). 
 124.  Id. at 2 (codified at ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.100 (2010)). 
 125.  See Shaftel, supra note 95, at 56–58. 
 126.  See id. 
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to rule on two issues: whether the “Transfer To the Trust is A Complete 
Gift” and whether the “Trust Is Not Includable In Grantor’s Estate.”127 
The IRS responded in Letter Rule 9837007, ruling favorably that the 
transfer was a completed gift but conditioning the completed gift upon 
the “representation that there is no express or implied agreement 
between the Donor and the Trustee.”128 The IRS refused to rule on 
whether the assets would be included in the settlor’s estate.129 It is 
possible that the IRS did not rule because it wanted to leave open the 
possibility of evidence that there was an implicit agreement between the 
settlor and trustee.130 
In 2009, the IRS again took up the issue,131 this time clarifying that a 
transfer is incomplete for federal tax purposes if the settlor retains 
“sufficient dominion and control” over the property within the meaning 
of I.R.C. Reg. 25.2511-2(b).132 The major difference here was that the 
donor specified that, upon death, the assets left in the trust would be 
divided into per stirpital shares and held in trust for the remaining 
beneficiaries.133 The relinquishing of her right to determine the 
distribution of assets postmortem allowed the trust to be excluded from 
the grantor’s estate under Internal Revenue Code Section 2036.134 
Based on Alaska’s continued work on its trust law and increase in 
protections for both settlors and trustees, it is possible to conclude that 
Alaska is set on its goal of being a global financial trust headquarters. 
However, to understand the obstacles still in the way, it is helpful to 
examine the current trust laws of other states. 
III. THE DOMESTIC ASSET PROTECTION TRUST LANDSCAPE 
A.  After the Alaska Trust Act 
Almost immediately following the passage of the Alaska Act, 
Delaware passed a domestic asset protection vehicle of its own. The 
Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act135 was passed in an effort to give 
 
 127.  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9837007 (Sept. 11, 1998). 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  See id. 
 130.  See Shaftel, supra note 95, at 57. 
 131.  See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200944002 (Oct. 30, 2009). 
 132.  ROTHSCHILD, supra note 96, at 8–9. 
 133.  Id. at 8. 
 134.  See id. at 9. Section 2036 provides the general rule that “[t]he value of the 
gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of any interest 
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer.” 26 U.S.C. § 2036 
(2012). 
 135.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3576 (2011). 
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Delaware a share of the $640 billion trust industry.136 In addition to 
following Alaska’s lead by eliminating the rule against perpetuities and 
allowing dynasty trusts,137 a Delaware trust would be privy to the same 
tax and estate benefits that an Alaska trust would be subject to. 
Delaware was also able to provide benefits that Alaska was unable to. 
First, Delaware is already home to the largest share of U.S. corporations 
and as such has built up the infrastructure to handle large assets. This is 
unlike Alaska, which was given unfavorable treatment in a 1986 survey 
examining Alaska’s chances of becoming an international financial 
center.138 Delaware also has close proximity to New York and Charlotte, 
which are major U.S. banking hubs. Finally, the fact that Delaware is 
located on the mainland may provide potential settlors easier access 
should they choose to travel to the location of their trust. 
Beyond these differences, Delaware also chose to create a possible 
advantage by allowing “tacking”139 of time for assets that were 
previously in a different trust and subsequently transferred into a 
Delaware asset protection trust.140 This allows settlors who already have 
their assets in a trust in another jurisdiction that bars creditors’ claims to 
freely move141 their assets to Delaware without the risk of opening up 
the trust assets to claims where the statute of limitations had already 
run. Delaware also empowered the trust advisors much more than 
Alaska. For example, in a Delaware asset protection trust, a settlor can 
hold the position of an “investment advisor,” which would allow the 
settlor to “direct, consent to or disapprove a fiduciary’s actual or 
proposed investment decisions.”142 A final Delaware benefit above all 
other domestic asset protection trusts is the ability for the settlor to 
receive up to five percent of the trust’s assets as specified in the trust 
instrument.143 While this disbursement will likely qualify as income for 
tax purposes and the distribution would likely be attachable by a 
 
 136.  See Brigid McMenamin, Flimsy Shelters, FORBES (Sept. 8, 1997), 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/1997/0908/6005094a.html. 
 137.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503 (2011). 
 138.  See House Minutes, supra note 49 (statement of Rep. Joe Ryan). 
 139.  Tacking is defined as “[t]he joining of consecutive periods of possession 
by different persons to treat the periods as one continuous period.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1590 (9th ed. 2009). 
 140.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572(b)(2) (2011). 
 141.  Delaware does have four required elements for a trust to tack: the trust 
must be irrevocable, distributions must be made at the trustee’s discretion, the 
trustee must be qualified, and the instrument must contain a Delaware choice of 
law clause. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(11) (2011). 
 142.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313(a) (2011). 
 143.  Id. § 3570(11)(b)(5). 
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claimant, the ability for the settlor to retain some extra amount of control 
can go a long ways when a trust seeker is weighing his or her options. 
Nevada was also quick to follow suit. In 1999, the Nevada 
Legislature passed the Spendthrift Trust Act.144 Following Alaska and 
Delaware generally, Nevada made it known that its purpose was to 
enforce self-settled asset protection trusts, except in the case of 
fraudulent transfers.145 In an attempt to set itself apart from Delaware 
and Alaska, Nevada expressly requires that trustees of asset protection 
trusts ignore federal and state bankruptcy courts seeking to pierce a 
trust’s shield.146 Additionally, Nevada chose not to walk the tightrope 
with regards to child support and spousal creditors that Alaska and 
Delaware did.147 Quite the opposite, the Nevada statute affirmatively 
denies access to anyone, “whether dependent upon the beneficiary or 
not.”148 
Additional benefits of a Nevada self-settled asset protection trust 
are that Nevada chose to limit its statute of limitations, and to this day, it 
 
 144.  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.010 (2010). 
 145.  See id. § 166.040(1)(b). 
 146.  See id. § 166.120(2). The statute provides the following provision: 
Payments by the trustee to the beneficiary, whether such payments are 
mandatory or discretionary, must be made only to or for the benefit of 
the beneficiary and not by way of acceleration or anticipation, nor to 
any assignee of the beneficiary, nor to or upon any order, written or 
oral, given by the beneficiary, whether such assignment or order be the 
voluntary contractual act of the beneficiary or be made pursuant to or 
by virtue of any legal process in judgment, execution, attachment, 
garnishment, bankruptcy or otherwise, or whether it be in connection 
with any contract, tort or duty. 
Id. (emphasis added). Nevada is not alone seeking to shield trusts from federal 
and state bankruptcy courts. See DAVID G. SHAFTEL, COMPARISON OF THE 
DOMESTIC ASSET PROTECTION TRUST STATUTES 13 (2010), available at 
http://shaftellaw.com/docs/comparison_domestic_apt_statutes.pdf (stating 
that Colorado and Missouri also do not provide that the spendthrift clause is a 
transfer restriction as described in the Bankruptcy Code). In May 2011, an 
Alaska bankruptcy court avoided a transfer of real property of a settlor of an 
Alaska self-settled asset protection trust. In re Mortensen, A09-90036-DMD, 2011 
WL 5025249 (Bankr. D. Alaska May 26, 2011), reconsideration denied, A09-90036-
DMD, 2011 WL 5025252 (Bankr. D. Alaska July 8, 2011). As noted, while Alaska 
does not follow Nevada, Colorado, or Missouri in addressing the Bankruptcy 
Code, the Alaska Bankruptcy Court was ruling on federal law. There is no 
reason to question this view of the federal bankruptcy statute as it pertains to 
self-settled asset protection trusts in other states. 
 147.  See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.090(1) (2010). The section explicitly 
excludes any person except the beneficiary. Id. 
 148.  See id. (“Provision for the beneficiary will be for the support, education, 
maintenance and benefit of the beneficiary alone, and without reference to or 
limitation by the beneficiary’s needs, station in life, or mode of life, or the needs of any 
other person, whether dependent upon the beneficiary or not.” (emphasis added)). 
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has the shortest statute of limitations against pre-existing creditors’ 
claims: just two years.149 Nevada also chose to follow Delaware in the 
area of settlor discretion and allows settlors to prevent the trustee from 
making a distribution without affecting the trust’s irrevocability.150 
As of 2010, a total of thirteen states offered some variation of 
Alaska’s asset protection trust, while two states are currently working 
on enacting similar legislation and have “placed their toe in the 
water.”151 
B.  Challenges to Domestic Asset Protection Trusts 
While domestic self-settled asset protection trusts have now been in 
existence almost fifteen years, there has been little in the way of 
meaningful case law challenging their major provisions.152 There are 
many possible stumbling blocks that have yet to be cleared. 
First, there is the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution.153 
It is very possible that a judgment in a state without an asset protection 
trust statute may be enforced against a trust in Alaska or some other 
state.154 While legislatures have attempted to make provisions through 
requirements that the trustee and trust be domiciled in the state, a court 
may be willing to find some type of in rem jurisdiction. 
Next, an argument can be made that asset protection trust statutes 
violate the Contracts Clause.155 A state’s laws violate the clause if they 
“substantially impair the obligations of parties to existing contracts or 
make them unreasonably difficult to enforce.”156 So long as a state’s 
asset protection law precludes pre-existing creditors from the creditors’ 
shield, states may not have substantial problems here since the clause 
has been interpreted to refer to existing contracts and not future ones.157 
 
  149.  Id. § 166.170(1)(a). 
 150.  Id. § 166.040(2). 
 151.  SHAFTEL, supra note 146, at 2–3. 
 152.  See Sirknen, supra note 40, at 158 (“[T]he author has been unable to find 
any case in which a creditor has brought a challenge to a domestic [asset 
protection trust].”). 
 153.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 154.  See Sirknen, supra note 40, at 152. 
 155.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 156.  Duncan E. Osborne et al., Asset Protection: Trust Planning, SJ036 ALI-
ABA 1419, 1446 (ALI-ABA C.L.E. Annual Advanced Course of Study Nov. 17–
21, 2003). 
 157.  Id. 
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Finally, in cases of corporate trustees, the minimum contacts test158 
may allow a claimant to bring suit in a non-asset protection trust state 
and argue that such trusts are against the forum state’s public policy.159 
CONCLUSION 
It has been almost fifteen years since Alaska made its ground- 
breaking move into the realm of domestic self-settled asset protection 
trusts. Since that time twelve additional states have followed it down 
that path. The big question is how is Alaska doing on its journey to be 
the trust capital of the United States? The answer is much easier asked 
than answered. This is, in large part, because two of the benefits of 
transferring assets to a trust are anonymity and confidentiality.160 The 
best indicator to date was a survey of Alaska trustees and attorneys 
done in 2002,161 five years after the Alaska Legislature enacted the law 
authorizing self-settled asset protection trusts. As of 2002, Alaska 
trustees had formed approximately 870 trusts for nonresidents of 
Alaska; approximately 310 were self-settled asset protection trusts.162 
The creation of these trusts employed approximately 110 Alaska 
attorneys.163 In addition, approximately 125 self-settled asset protection 
trusts had been created for Alaska residents while another 200 to 300 
perpetual trusts, which were made available through Alaska’s repeal of 
the rule against perpetuities, were formed.164 Since the passage of the 
original Act, advocates of offshore asset protection trusts have argued 
that domestic trusts are still unable to compete with offshore trusts in 
 
 158.  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that 
an out-of-state defendant must have minimum contacts with a state in order for 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction by that state to be proper). 
 159.  See Sirknen, supra note 40, at 142–43. The public policy argument 
becomes more difficult as more and more states adopt similar asset protection 
trust statutes. 
 160.  Telephone Interview with David G. Shaftel, Attorney, Shaftel Law 
Offices, PC (Dec. 3, 2010). Mr. Shaftel stated that it was very difficult to gather 
information regarding the number of trusts opened and even more so regarding 
the amount of assets held in trust. This is particularly difficult because a 
tangential benefit of having assets in trust is that they do not show up as 
personal assets and therefore are often hidden from creditors. This is especially 
true of assets that are held in offshore trusts. Id. 
 161.  See Shaftel, supra note 95. 
 162.  See id. at 507. Shaftel notes that all the statistics are anecdotal and were 
gathered through personal surveys of institutions and individuals who were 
likely to act as trustees for nonresident trusts. See id. at 507 n.3. 
 163.  Id. at 507. 
 164.  See id. 
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the area of maximum creditor protection, and thus the primary focus of 
Alaska’s asset protection trusts has shifted to tax reduction.165 
It appears, at least based on what little evidence is available, that 
Alaska is still far from reaching its goal of becoming a financial hub for 
asset protection. This goal may simply be unattainable due to the 
increase in competition from its sister states, all of which have closer 
access points for their residents to setup asset protection trusts than 
Alaska. Additionally, Alaska is unable to compete with offshore 
jurisdictions which are not bound by U.S. federal law. Although 
becoming a hub for the global trust market may be an unachievable 
goal, Alaska seems to have attracted increased assets to the state, seems 
to have increased notoriety in the trust and estates community 
generally, and seems to have created additional work for its professional 
workers. So long as Alaska continues to maintain its progressive stance 
on asset protection trusts, it should continue to benefit from increased 
awareness among scholars, attorneys, and trust seekers. 
 
 165.  See id. 
